

liked you and were going to be good and kind, till you got to know them, than you would with the Africans. You could soon tell that the Africans liked you. You could see they did. It would take longer to find out with the Chinese, because their faces don't show so easily what they think of you!"

But characteristics must not be considered in isolation. They do not appear alone, but embodied in persons who act and speak, gesture and look, in particular contexts and situations. It is the totality that is disquieting or reassuring, not particular components, though these may play an important part, or be made to do so by the person concerned. A Chinaman who mends one's kite, who is known to parents and neighbours, who is met near home and who is patient and kind, has eyes that are no less "slit" and a skin that is no less yellow than those of a Chinaman who is met far from home, whom nobody knows, who does not speak and who behaves oddly; but the effect is quite different and eyes and colour may be spoken of in quite different terms.

When interaction does not occur, the unusual or striking characteristic plays a more important part, as when people are merely seen, either in the flesh or in a photograph. In second-hand experiences, however, such characteristics as Chinese colour and eyes can be exaggerated, and their effect heightened by making their owners behave appropriately; so we get the sinister and mysterious Chinaman, the savage African Negro, the cheerful Negro clown, and the other stereotypes of the films and other fictions. The influence of such experiences can be very great if contact does not occur, or if it occurs under such conditions as to be unsatisfactory or disturbing. The effects can be overcome by satisfactory contacts, but these do not always take place.

## THE DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDREN OF THE IDEA OF THE HOMELAND AND OF RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

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Any psychological and sociological study of tensions presupposes some acquaintance with certain findings of child psychology. We may begin by enquiring whether, in view of their particular method of development, the cognitive and affective attitudes associated with loyalty to the homeland and initial contacts with other countries may not be at the root of subsequent international maladjustments. Even if this theory does not at first glance appear to be borne out by facts, we should next proceed to investigate why the child, as he grows, does not acquire enough objectiveness and understanding of others, or readiness to give and take, to withstand those influences for tension or maladjustment that are brought to bear upon him in adolescence or adult life.

These were the two points of view on which the survey described below was based. From the very outset, we were struck by the fact that, whilst children, in the initial stages of their development, did not appear to display any marked inclination towards nationalism, a slow and laborious process in developing a faculty for cognitive and affective integration was necessary before children attained an awareness of their own homeland and that of

others; this faculty, being far more complex than would appear on first consideration, is accordingly precarious and liable to be upset by later impacts. For the purpose of studying social and international tensions in general, it is therefore worth giving close consideration to the development and nature of this faculty for integration, since subsequent disturbances will, in the last resort, depend on its strength—or its weakness.

Admittedly, our survey covered only Swiss or foreign children living in Geneva, and, in interpreting the data assembled, some allowance should be made for the influence of the children's adult environment. But, even if we make this allowance, and pending confirmation of our findings by surveys in other areas, we are faced with a paradox which, though it may be peculiar to a particular part of Europe, is none the less indicative.

This paradox may be summed up as follows: the feeling and the very idea of the homeland are by no means the first or even early elements in the child's make-up, but are a relatively late development in the normal child, who does not appear to be drawn inevitably towards patriotic sociocentricity. On the contrary, before he attains to a cognitive and affective awareness of his own country, the child must make a considerable effort towards "decentration" or broadening of his centres of interest (town, canton, etc.) and towards integration of his impressions (with surroundings other than his own), in the course of which he acquires an understanding of countries and points of view different from his own. The readiness with which the various forms of nationalist sociocentricity later emerge can only be accounted for by supposing, either that at some stage there emerge influences extraneous to the trends noticeable during the child's development (but then why are these influences accepted?), or else that the same obstacles that impede the process of "decentration" and integration (once the idea of homeland takes shape) crop up again at all levels and constitute the commonest cause of disturbances and tensions.

Our interpretation is based on the second hypothesis. The child begins with the assumption that the immediate attitudes arising out of his own special surroundings and activities are the only ones possible: this state of mind, which we shall term the unconscious egocentricity (both cognitive and affective) of the child is at first a stumbling-block both to the understanding of his own country and to the development of objective relationships with other countries. Furthermore, to overcome this egocentric attitude, it is necessary to train the faculty for cognitive and affective integration; this is a slow and laborious process, consisting mainly in efforts at "reciprocity", and at each new stage of the process, egocentricity re-emerges in new guises farther and farther removed from the child's initial centre of interest. These are the various forms of sociocentricity—a survival of the original egocentricity—and they are the cause of subsequent disturbances or tensions, any understanding of which must be based on an accurate analysis of the initial stages and of the elementary conflicts between egocentricity and understanding of others ("reciprocity").

We shall set forth under three separate headings the facts we have been able to assemble; in the first section we shall study the cognitive and affective development of the idea of homeland (between four and five and 12 years of age); in the second section we shall analyse the reactions of children towards countries other than their own, while the third section will deal with the problem of cognitive and affective understanding of others ("reciprocity").

Over 200 children between four and five and 14 and 15 years of age were questioned.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF THE HOMELAND

The child's gradual realization that he belongs to a particular country presupposes a parallel process of cognitive and affective development. This is not surprising, since any mental attitude is always a blend of cognitive and affective components (the cognitive functions determine the "pattern" of behaviour, whilst the affective functions provide its "dynamism", or driving force, which is responsible for the net result by which behaviour is judged). But there is more than interdependence between the two: the cognitive and affective aspects may be said to be parallel or isomorphous, since the very young find the intellectual concept of "reciprocity" as difficult to grasp as affective "reciprocity" when this passes beyond the range of their immediate practical experience.

*Cognitive Aspect*

We came across normal children who, until they were seven or eight years old, had none of the basic knowledge essential to understanding the idea of their country. One boy of seven was positive that Paris was in Switzerland because the people there spoke French, and that Berne was not in Switzerland. As a rule, very young children, up to five or six years of age, are apparently unaware that Geneva is in Switzerland. At the outset, then, children have only a simple notion of the territory in which they live (e.g., their home town), a notion comprising a more or less direct knowledge of certain characteristics (approximate size, main language spoken, etc.), but these ideas are mixed up with verbal notions such as "canton", "Switzerland", etc., which they can neither understand nor fit into a coherent picture. Among these verbal notions picked up from other children or adults, one finally becomes rooted in their minds at about five or six years of age: this is that "Geneva is in Switzerland". But the interesting point is whether this piece of acquired knowledge immediately affects their attitude.

Until they are about seven or eight, though children may assert that Geneva is part of Switzerland, they none the less think of the two as situated side by side. When asked to draw the relationship between Geneva and Switzerland by means of circles or closed figures, they are not able to show how the part is related to the whole, but merely give a drawing of juxtaposed units:

*Arllette C.* 7;6.<sup>1</sup> Have you heard of Switzerland? *Yes, it's a country.* Where is this country? *I don't know, but it's very big.* Is it near or a long way from here? *It's near, I think.* What is Geneva? *It's a town.* Where is Geneva? *In Switzerland* (The child draws Geneva and Switzerland as two circles side by side).

*Mathilde B.* 6;8. Have you heard of Switzerland? *Yes.* What is it? *A canton.* And what is Geneva? *A town.* Where is Geneva? *In Switzerland* (The child draws the two circles side by side). Are you Swiss? *No, I'm Genevese.*

<sup>1</sup> Editors note. 7;6 abbreviation for 7 years 6 months.

*Claude M.* 6;9. What is Switzerland? *It's a country.* And Geneva? *A town.* Where is Geneva? *In Switzerland* (The child draws the two circles side by side but the circle for Geneva is smaller). *I'm drawing the circle for Geneva smaller because Geneva is smaller. Switzerland is very big.* Quite right, but where is Geneva? *In Switzerland.* Are you Swiss? *Yes.* And are you Genevese? *Oh no! I'm Swiss now.*

We see that these children think of Switzerland as comparable to Geneva itself but situated somewhere outside. Switzerland is of course "near" Geneva and "bigger". But they do not understand, either geographically or logically, that Geneva is in Switzerland. Geographically, it is alongside. Logically, they are Genevese, and not Swiss, or "Swiss now" (like Claude) but no longer Genevese—which in both cases shows inability to understand how the part is included in the whole.

At a second stage (7-8 to 10-11 years of age), children grasp the idea that Geneva is enclosed spatially in Switzerland and draw their relationship not as two juxtaposed circles but as one circle enveloping the other. But the idea of this spatial enclosure is not yet matched by any idea that logical categories can be included one in another.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst the category of Genevese is relatively concrete, that of Swiss is more remote and abstract: children, then, still cannot be Swiss and Genevese "at the same time".

*Florence N.* 7;3. What is Switzerland? *It's a country.* And Geneva? *It's a town.* Where is Geneva? *In Switzerland* (Drawing correct). What nationality are you? *I'm from Vaud.* Where is the canton of Vaud? *In Switzerland, not far away* (The child is made to do another drawing showing Switzerland and the canton of Vaud. Result correct). Are you Swiss as well? *No.* How is that, since you've said that the canton of Vaud is in Switzerland? *You can't be two things at once, you have to choose; you can be a Vaudois like me, but not two things together.*

*Pierre G.* 9;0. (The child replied correctly to our first questions and did the drawing properly.) What is your nationality? *I'm Swiss.* How is that? *Because I live in Switzerland.* You're Genevese too? *No, I can't be.* Why not? *I'm Swiss now and can't be Genevese as well.* But if you are Swiss because you live in Switzerland, aren't you also Genevese because you live in Geneva?....

*Jean-Claude B.* 9;3. You've heard of Switzerland, I suppose? *Yes, it's a country.* And what is Geneva? *A town.* Where is this town? *In Switzerland* (The drawing was correct). What is your nationality? *I'm Bernese.* Are you Swiss? *Yes.* How is that? *Because Berne is in Switzerland.* So you can be Bernese and Swiss at the same time? *No, I can't.* Why not? *Because I'm already Bernese.*

The reader can see how these children hesitate: some, like Florence, deny the possibility of being "two things together", although they have just asserted and illustrated with their drawings that Geneva and Vaud are in Switzerland; others, influenced by statements heard repeatedly in their family or in school,

<sup>1</sup> Geneva is drawn as a small circle within the large circle which represents Switzerland. However, Switzerland is often thought of as a large circle separate from the small circle.

hesitate to admit that they belong both to their home town (or canton) and to their country, and don't really believe they can: Jean-Claude, after first admitting it, hastens to add that it is impossible when he hears the words "at the same time"; and Pierre, who says he is Swiss and not Genevese, can only justify his statement by an argument that applies to Geneva as well ("because I live in Switzerland"). It may be said that their real loyalty is to the canton and not to their country. But we find the same response in children who are not living in or do not even know their canton, as well as in Genevese who know they belong there. We have met children who hardly know their home canton, yet stoutly declare they belong to it, out of attachment to their family. The fact is, that at this stage the homeland is still only an abstract notion: what counts is the town, or the family, etc., and the statements heard there; but the children do not yet synthesize these statements into any coherent system.

However, at 10-11 years of age, children enter upon a third stage, in the course of which their ideas are finally synthesized correctly.

*Micheline P.* 10;3. (The child replies correctly to the first questions and makes an accurate drawing.) What is your nationality? *I'm Swiss.* How is that? *Because my parents are Swiss.* Are you Genevese as well? *Naturally, because Geneva is in Switzerland.* And if I ask someone from Vaud if he is Swiss too? *Of course, the canton of Vaud is in Switzerland. People from Vaud are Swiss, just like us. Everyone living in Switzerland is Swiss and belongs to a canton too.*

*Jean-Luc L.* 11;1. (The child replies correctly to our first questions and makes no mistakes with the drawing.) What nationality are you? *I'm from St. Gallen.* How is that? *My father is from St. Gallen.* Are you Swiss too? *Yes, St. Gallen is in Switzerland, even though the people there talk German.* Then you are two things at once? *Yes, it's the same thing, since St. Gallen is in Switzerland. All people from Swiss cantons are Swiss. I'm from St. Gallen and still Swiss, and there are others who are Genevese or Bernese and still Swiss.*

It is only at this stage that the notion of country becomes a reality and takes on the idea of homeland in the child's mind. The problem is then to determine whether this development is merely the outcome of a cognitive correlation (inclusion of the part in the whole); whether the age at which these correlations are understood depends on affective factors; or whether both sets of factors evolve side by side.

#### *Affective aspect*

Obviously, the child's emotions cannot be analysed in the course of a simple conversation of the kind used for ascertaining his logical make-up. Nevertheless, though no absolute significance can be ascribed to the actual content of his value judgments, and although, in particular, the importance of affective reactions he cannot put into words must not be overlooked, it is still possible, through comparison of replies made at different ages to quite commonplace questions (what country do you prefer, etc.) to draw some conclusions as to both the type of motivation and the real but unexpressed motives. It is a striking fact that the three stages briefly described above correspond,

as regards affective evaluations, to three stages in a clearly marked process of "decentration", starting from motives essentially bound up with subjective or personal impressions (of the most fleeting or even accidental kind) and progressing towards acceptance of the values common to the group, first to the family group and then society as a whole.

During the first stage, the child who is asked for a value judgment does not even think of voicing any preference for Switzerland. He likes any country that appeals to his fancy at the moment and, if Switzerland is chosen, it is for some such reason. The following are the preferences actually expressed by three Swiss youngsters.

*Evelyne M. 5;9. I like Italy. It's a nicer place than Switzerland. Why? I was there these holidays. They have the loveliest cakes, not like in Switzerland, where there are things inside that make you cry. . . .*

*Denise S. 6;0. I like Switzerland because it has such pretty houses. I was in the mountains and they were all full of chalets. It's so pretty, and you can get milk there.*

*Jacques G. 6;3. I like Germany best because my mummy just got back from there to-night. It's ever so big and far away an' my mummy lives there.*

These childish affective reactions are analogous to the difficulty, usually experienced by children during this first stage, of integrating their country, canton or town in one logical concept. The question then arises whether it is because it does not yet represent an affective reality that the country is merely juxtaposed to the canton or town, instead of being included in it as part of a whole, or whether it is because the idea of inclusion cannot be logically grasped that the country does not yet arouse any real affective response. A third solution is obviously possible: as reality is centred around their own particular doings and immediate interests, children at stage I lack the requisite logical "decentration" to conceive of their town or canton as enclosed in a larger whole; nor have they a sufficient degree of affective "decentration" to grasp collective realities outside their narrow individual or inter-individual circle: at this level, their failure to grasp the idea of their country or homeland, either on the cognitive or on the affective plane, thus represents two interdependent and parallel aspects of the same spontaneous, unconscious egocentricity—the original obstacle to any integration of logical relationships and affective values.

Next we give the typical reactions at stage II to the same questions of preference or choice.

*Denis K. 8;3. I like Switzerland because I was born there.*

*Pierrette J. 8;9. I like Switzerland because it's my own country. My mummy and daddy are Swiss, so I think Switzerland's a nice place.*

*Jacqueline M. 9;3. I like Switzerland. It's the loveliest country for me. It's my own country.*

The reader senses immediately that, despite the persistence of the same egocentric statements as at stage I, the motivation is quite different: family loyalties and traditions now begin to predominate over purely personal motives.

The country becomes the *terra patria*, and, though there is still difficulty in ranging the town, canton and nation in an exact order, this is unimportant: their common and therefore undifferentiated affective appeal is based on family feeling. Thus we have here a close parallel between the inability to make logical distinctions (e.g., the idea of spatial or spatio-temporal inclusion is accepted, but not that of the inclusion of one class of ideas in another) and the inability to make affective distinctions, so that the different conceptions are reduced to a single emotional factor—that of family tradition. To be more precise, considerable progress has been made in both directions at once; we find the beginnings of logical “decentration”, enabling the child to subordinate his territory (town or canton) to a larger unit in which it is enclosed; and, at the same time, the beginnings of affective “decentration”, enabling him to subordinate his egocentric motives to collective values beyond his personal interests. But, in both cases, this process of “decentration” has only just begun and is restricted by the above-mentioned inability to differentiate (due to the remnants of egocentricity surviving in more extensive form in the new field of consciousness recently mastered).

At the third stage, finally, the motivations once again change and are more or less adjusted to certain collective ideals of the national community:

*Juliette N.* 10;3. *I like Switzerland because we never have any war here.*

*Lucien O.* 11;2. *I like Switzerland because it's a free country.*

*Michelle G.* 11;5. *I like Switzerland because it's the Red Cross country. In Switzerland, our neutrality makes us charitable.*

Neutrality, freedom, a country spared by war, the Red Cross, official charity, and so on: it sounds like a naïve summary of patriotic village speeches! But the very banality of these motivations is revealing: the most general collective ideals are those which make the strongest appeal to the child. Merely to state that he repeats what he has been told at school is not enough to explain why he repeats it and, more especially, why he understands it; he gives these reasons because, beyond his personal feelings and the motives of family loyalty, he is finally realizing that there exists a wider community with its own values distinct from those of the ego, the family, the town and visible or concrete realities. In brief, he is attaining to a scale of values culminating in relatively abstract virtues, and at the same time he is succeeding in integrating spatio-temporal and logical relationships into the invisible whole formed by the nation or the country: here, once more, we have parallelism between the processes of logical “decentration” or integration, on the one hand, and affective or ethical “decentration” or integration on the other.

## II

### OTHER COUNTRIES

We shall now give a brief account of this second part of our investigation, considered from the following two standpoints. First of all, we wished to determine whether ideas or feelings about other countries, or peoples of other nationalities (as far as the child was acquainted with any such) develop along the same lines as those referred to in the first section, or whether there is an appreciable difference between the two types of concepts. Our second,

and more important aim, was to lead up to the analysis of "reciprocity" which is presented in the third section. For whether the child's ideas and affective reactions regarding his own and other countries develop along similar or different lines, it will be instructive to discover how, in the light of those attitudes, he arrives at that intellectual and ethical "reciprocity" which is, essentially, the faculty for social awareness and international understanding. Admittedly, the "decentration" we have just described, in contrast with the initial egocentricity during stages I-III may, in part, result from active relationships set up by the child, and in that case will necessarily lead to a certain degree of reciprocity: or, to be more precise, it will constitute an integral part of that reciprocity, of which it will be both the effect and the cause. But such "decentration" may also result, to some extent, from the pressure of the social environment: in that case, it will not automatically lead to an attitude of reciprocity, but is just as likely to transform egocentricity into sociocentricity as into real understanding. It is thus essential to make a further study—for the purpose of gathering preliminary data, and by using a process of interrogation similar to those previously adopted—of the child's reactions towards countries other than his own, before presenting him with the problem of reciprocity as such. But, in view of the similarity we have noted, from the intellectual standpoint, between the new reactions and those we have just described, it is pointless to examine separately the development of logical concepts, on the one hand, and the affective aspect of the replies, on the other hand, since the latter alone present any fresh interest.

The children at stage I are found<sup>1</sup> to have the same intellectual difficulty about including the part in the whole in regard to other countries as in regard to their own, and the same judgments, based on subjective and fugitive considerations:<sup>1</sup>

*Arlette.* 7;6 (Genevese). Do you know any other countries, foreign countries? *Yes, Lausanne.* Where is Lausanne? *In Geneva* (Juxtaposed circles).

*Pierre G.* 9;0 (cf. Chapter I, stage II). Do you know any foreign countries? *Yes, France, Africa and America.* Do you know what is the capital of France? *Lyons, I think, I was there with daddy, it's in France* (Juxtaposed circles, Lyons touching France "because the city of Lyons is on the edge of France"). And what are the people who live in Lyons? *Frenchmen.* Are they Lyonese too? *Yes. . . . no, they can't be. They can't have two nationalities at once.*

*Monique C.* 5;5. Are there any people who don't live in Geneva? *Yes, there are the people living in the Diablerets.* How do you know? *I was on holidays there.* Are there people who don't live either in Geneva or in the Diablerets? *Yes, there is Lausanne. My aunt lives there.* Is there any difference between the people of Geneva and other people? *Yes, the others are nicer.* Why? The people who don't live in Geneva are nicer than the people who do? *Oh yes, in the Diablerets I always get chocolate to eat.*

*Bernard D.* 6;3. Have you heard of any people who are not Swiss? *Yes, there are the people of the Valais* (Valais, as everyone knows, is one of the 22 Swiss cantons, and the child himself is a native of Valais). And have

<sup>1</sup> We have come across normally intelligent school children living in Geneva who had reached the age of seven without having ever heard of France ("No! I don't know what that is"), but only of Savoy, etc.

you heard of other countries too? Are there any differences between the countries? *Oh yes, there isn't a lake everywhere. And are the people the same? No, people don't all have the same voice and then they don't all wear the same pullovers. At Nax, I saw some lovely pullovers, all embroidered in front.*

*Herbert S. 7;2.* Are there any differences between the different countries you know and the different people living there? *Oh yes. Can you give me an instance? Well, the Americans are stupid. If I ask them where the rue du Mont Blanc is, they can't tell me.*

It is superfluous to stress the analogies between the reactions of this stage as recorded above and those described in the first section: their concurrence is the less surprising since most of these children are unaware of belonging to their own particular country (cf. Bernard once again).

The reactions of children at stage II, on the other hand, reveal that their ideas of other countries have developed in exactly the same way as those concerning their own, but frequently with an antagonism between the two types of affective ideas or reactions. Identical development in the first place: in both cases, there has been a "decentration" of the original egocentric attitude, which has now given way to an acceptance of the ideas or traditions of the child's immediate environment, especially those of his family. But thereafter—and the possible antagonism originates here—the child's reactions towards other nationalities may be guided into the most varied channels, according to whether his social environment is understanding, critical, or even censorious of foreigners. Here are some instances of these acquired attitudes, the last of them shedding light on the degree of logic to which the child has attained:

*Murielle D. 8;2.* Have you heard of foreigners? *Yes, there are Germans and French. Are there any differences between these foreigners? Yes, the Germans are bad, they're always making war. The French are poor and everything's dirty there. Then I've heard of Russians too, they're not at all nice. Do you have any personal knowledge of the French, Germans or Russians or have you read something about them? No. Then how do you know? Everyone says so.*

*François D. 9;0.* Have you heard of such people as foreigners? *Yes, Italians, Germans, the French and the English. Are there any differences between all these people from all these different countries? Of course. What difference? The language, and then in England everyone's sick. How do you know? Daddy told Mummy. And what do you think of the French? They went to war and they haven't got much to eat, only bread. And what do you think of the Germans? They're nasty. They quarrel with everyone. But how do you know that? Have you been to France or Germany? Yes, I've been to the Salève. And it was there that you saw that the French have practically nothing to eat? No, we took our food with us. Then how do you know what you've told us? I don't know.*

*Michel M. 9;6.* Have you heard of such people as foreigners? *Yes, the French, the Americans, the Russians, the English. . . . Quite right. Are there differences between all these people? Oh yes, they don't speak the same language. And what else? I don't know. What do you think of the French, for instance? Do you like them or not? Try and tell me as much*

as possible. *The French are not very serious, they don't worry about anything, an' it's dirty there.* And what do you think of the Americans? *They're ever so rich and clever. They've discovered the atom bomb.* And what do you think of the Russians? *They're bad, they're always wanting to make war.* And what's your opinion of the English? *I don't know . . . they're nice. . . .* Now look, how did you come to know all you've told me? *I don't know . . . I've heard it . . . that's what people say.*

*Claudine B. 9;11.* Do you know any other countries besides Switzerland? *Yes, Italy, France and England. I know Italy quite well, I was on holidays there with Mummy and Daddy.* What town were you in? *In Florence* (Drawn correctly). What nationality is a child living in Florence? *He's Italian.* Is he a Florentine too? *Oh yes, Florence is in Italy. . . .* Do you know any town in France? *Yes, Paris and Lyons* (Drawn correctly). And what are the people living in Paris? *French.* And are they Parisians too? *Yes, oh no, you can't be two things at once.* Is Paris a country? *No, a town.* So you can't be Parisian and French at the same time? *No, I don't think so, you can't have two names. . . .* *Oh yes, Paris is in France.*

It is easy to perceive the mechanism of such reactions. Whilst the "decentration" of attitudes towards adoption of family traditions may lead to the beginnings of a healthy patriotism, it may also give rise to a kind of tribal outlook, with values based on the disparagement of other social groups. In discarding his fugitive subjective judgments, and replacing them by the judgments of his environment, the child is, in a sense, taking a step forward, since he is projecting his mind into a system of relationships which broaden it and give it increased flexibility. But two courses then lie open to him: acquiescence (with its positive and negative aspects) and reciprocity, which requires independence of judgment in those concerned. Now none of the remarks just quoted give any impression of dawning independence or "reciprocity": everything suggests that, on discovering the values accepted in his immediate circle, the child felt bound to accept that circle's opinions of all other national groups.

It is evident, of course, that harsh judgments are not the unbroken rule, and that favourable estimates are accepted like the others. But even in the latter case, we are faced with the psychological problem that results from any action by the social group and, for that matter, from any form of education: is the spirit of understanding engendered by the content of the ideas inculcated, or simply by the process of exchange? In other words, if a child receives his opinions—even the soundest opinions—ready-made, does he thereby learn to judge for himself, and does he acquire the faculty for integration which will enable him, if need be, to rectify deviations and to overcome tensions?

Let us again see what are the typical reactions of children at stage III, when their intellectual and affective progress seems to come nearer to independence in the formation of logical judgments and estimates and to the attitude of reciprocity inseparable therefrom:

*Jean-Luc L. 11;1* (of section I, stage III). Do you know any foreign countries? *Yes, lot, France, Germany.* And any foreign cities? *Paris.* Where is this city? *In France, it's the capital of France.* (Drawn correctly.) And what nationality are the people who live in Paris? *They're French.* And what else? *They're Parisians, too, because Paris is in France.*

*Martin A.* 11;9 (mentions a very large number of foreign countries). Is there any difference between all those people? *Yes, they don't all talk the same language. And are there any other differences? Are some better, more intelligent, or more likable? I don't know. They're all much the same, each has his own mentality. What do you mean by mentality? Some like war and others want to be neutral. That depends on the country. How do you know that? I've heard people say so and you hear it on the wireless, and at school, the teacher explained that Switzerland is a neutral country.*

*Jacques W.* 13;9 (mentions a very large number of foreign countries). Are there any differences between all those people? *Yes, they're not all of the same race and don't have the same language. And you don't find the same faces everywhere, the same types, the same morals and the same religion. But do all these differences have any effect on the people? Oh yes, they don't all have the same mentality. Each people has its own special background.*

*Jean B.* 13;3 (mentions a very large number of foreign countries). Are there any differences between all those countries? *There is only a difference of size and position between all these countries. It's not the country that makes the difference, but the people. You find all types of people everywhere.*

But the same problem confronts us here as when we were considering stage II: is the progress achieved to be attributed to an increasing conformity between the child's judgments and those of his environment, accompanied by a tendency to reject exaggerated views and to prefer a middle and moderate course; or is it the result of a kind of new liberation from his immediate surroundings, which favours a wider outlook? We have already observed (section I), in connexion with this same stage III, how the child's mind can arrive simultaneously at a logical conception of whole units and an affective awareness of the larger unit represented by the national group as compared with the more immediate environment, ranging from the family to the town. It would therefore seem that these reactions—unlike those of children at stage II, who are apt to stress the contrast between the homeland and foreign countries—are progressing towards an attitude of "reciprocity". But how far can this be assumed to go?

The general conclusion of this chapter, as compared with that of the previous chapter, is, therefore, as follows: the mastery of the concept of the homeland may be interpreted as the culmination of a gradual "decentration", correlative with a process of integration which is applied to a succession of ever larger units. But study of children's reactions towards other countries shows us that this "decentration" may take either of two possible forms: egocentricity, defeated on one plane, may reappear on another plane in the form of a sociocentricity ranging from the naive to the extremely subtle; or, on the contrary, the conquest of egocentricity may mean an advance towards "reciprocity". At this point, we should try to find out whether it is possible to assess the strength of this latter factor.

## RECIPROCITY

For the purpose of analysing the understanding of reciprocity as such, while still keeping to the subject of relations between the homeland and other countries, we put two types of question to the same children, 4-5 and 11-12 years of age. To investigate the formation of logical connexions, which, as we have seen, go far to reveal the stage of development of the nationalist concept, we asked each child what a foreigner was, and whether he himself could become a foreigner in certain circumstances (travel, etc.). From the point of view of affective motivations and attitudes, we put the following questions, which lent themselves to illuminating comparisons: "If you had been born without any nationality, what country would you choose, and why?" and "If I asked a little French boy the same question, what country would he choose, and why?"

On this crucial point of reciprocity, as in previous respects, we found an exact parallel between intellectual development and affective understanding. As for the formation of logical concepts, the replies at stage I reflected the notion of the foreigner as something absolute, and an inability to grasp the meaning of reciprocity, that is to say, of the essential relativity of this relationship: foreigners are people belonging to other countries ( ), whereas the Swiss (or Genevese, etc.) cannot be regarded as foreigners, even outside their own country. In the matter of affective motivations, children at this same stage thought that, if they had no homeland, they would choose their present one, but could not understand that French or English children would also choose their respective countries. At stage II, the two types of question call forth intermediate replies, showing the beginnings of reciprocity, together with obvious remnants of egocentricity; and, at stage III, reciprocity gains the upper hand in regard to both types of question.

*Intellectual Aspect: the idea of the foreigner*

As we found in section I, in connexion with the idea of the homeland at this same stage, a certain fund of knowledge is essential if the child is to understand the actual question put to him. Until the child knows the exact meaning of the word "foreigner", it is pointless to present him with the problem of "reciprocity", as the responses would only be something like the following :

*Georges G.* 6;10. What is a foreigner? *I don't know.* Have you ever seen any? *Oh yes.* How did you know they were foreigners? *By their clothes mostly. They wear old clothes. They're always going off to the country.*

*Corinne M.* 6;11. Do you know what foreigners are? *I don't know, but I've seen some. They're soldiers.*

However, once the word is understood, the question of reciprocity may be raised, but at stage I, the response is usually negative.

*Georges B.* 7;5. What nationality have you? *I'm Swiss.* Are you a foreigner? *No.* Do you know any foreigners? *Yes.* Who, for instance? *People living a long way off.* Now imagine you were travelling in France, could you also become a foreigner in certain ways? *No, I'm Swiss.* Could

a Frenchman be a foreigner? *Of course a Frenchman is a foreigner. And is a Frenchman a foreigner in France? Naturally.*

*Ivan M. 8;9. What nationality have you? I'm Swiss. Are you a foreigner in Switzerland? No, I'm Swiss. And if you go to France? I stay Swiss, just as before. Do you know any foreigners? Yes, the French. And is a Frenchman a foreigner when he comes to Switzerland? Yes, he's a foreigner. And a Frenchman who stays in France? He stays a foreigner just as before.*

*Marie B. 8;0. What nationality have you? I'm from Geneva. Are you a foreigner? No. Do you know any foreigners? Yes, the people of Lausanne. If you go to Lausanne, do you become a foreigner? No, I'm Genevese. And is a person from Lausanne a foreigner? Yes, he lives in Lausanne. And if he comes to Geneva, does he stay a foreigner or not? He's still a native of Lausanne, so he's a foreigner.*

Before we conclude that these reactions reflect a failure to grasp the essence of "reciprocity", two possible objections should be discussed. Firstly, it might be argued that it is a mere verbal misunderstanding: it is the word "foreigner" and not the idea which, in this case, gives rise to confusion. To put it differently, the word "foreigner" could be wrongly interpreted as "not Swiss" or not "Genevese", etc., thus giving the impression of non-reciprocity, even though the child might actually be capable of true reciprocity. But this objection may be readily countered by the facts. The replies quoted above are, in fact, typical of a category of very general reactions up to seven or eight years of age and persisting even longer in relation to certain classes of ideas. Thus it is quite common for a boy at this level to assert that he has a brother, but that his brother has none;<sup>1</sup> or children may correctly put out their right or left hand, but cannot tell which is which in the case of a person sitting opposite;<sup>2</sup> or they may have neighbours but do not regard themselves as these people's neighbours,<sup>3</sup> and so on. It is no mere chance, then, if relative concepts become absolute in their minds: this is due to the lack of any power to construct logical relationships or to attain to reciprocity in practice.

A second objection may then be made: could it not be a mere deficiency in reasoning power—affecting the sense of relativity itself—and not a lack of reciprocity as an attitude of mind? There are two answers to this objection. Firstly, relativity (in this particular case the "symmetrical" character of the relationships under consideration) is the result of an operation: the deduction that  $A=B$  means the same as  $B=A$ , is a conversion operation and, from the psychologist's point of view, the operation is the cause and the relationships deduced are the effect. Any failure to grasp the relativity of a concept is therefore due to a lack of adequate operational equipment. Now the operations producing a sense of relativity are tantamount to a system of reciprocity. Secondly, the surest proof that we have to do with a deep-rooted mental attitude and not merely with logical results is, as we shall see later, that this failure to grasp the meaning of reciprocity is matched by an egocentric motivation in the values themselves.

<sup>1</sup> Piaget: *Le jugement et le raisonnement chez l'enfant.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Nicolescu: *Les idées des enfants sur la famille et le village* (Étude sur les enfants roumains. Geneva thesis, 1936.)

During stage II, we find a series of reactions midway between those described above and reciprocity, as instanced by the following:

*Jacques D.* 8;3. Do you know what foreigners are? *Yes, they're the people who come from Valais. I have an aunt from Valais and when she comes to Geneva, she's a foreigner.*

*Elaine K.* 8;9. What nationality have you? *I'm Swiss.* And what are you in Switzerland? *Swiss.* Are you a foreigner? *No.* And if you go to France? *I'm still Swiss.* Are you a foreigner? *No.* Is a Frenchman a foreigner? *Yes.* And what is a Frenchman in Switzerland? *French, but a little bit Swiss, too, if he's here.* And a Frenchman in France? *He's French.*

*Jean-Jacques R.* 8;8. What nationality have you? *I'm Swiss.* What is a Swiss when he's in Switzerland? *He's Swiss.* Is he a foreigner? *No.* And what is a Swiss who goes to France? *He's a foreigner and Swiss, because he's Swiss.* And what is a Frenchman? *A foreigner.* What is a Frenchman who comes to Switzerland? *He's Swiss because he comes to Geneva.* And if he stays in France? *He's French.* Is he a foreigner too? *Yes.* And when the Frenchman is in Switzerland, is he a foreigner then too? *No, he's in Switzerland.*

*Jules M.* 8;9. Do you know what a foreigner is? *Yes; they're the people who come from other countries. There's a foreigner in my class, he comes from France.* Can a Swiss become a foreigner? *Oh no.*

*Monique B.* 9;4. What nationality are you? *I'm from Vaud.* What is a Swiss in Switzerland? *He's Swiss.* Is he a foreigner? *No.* If a Swiss goes to France, what is he? *A foreigner and a Vaudois at the same time.* Why? *Because the French don't know us properly and look on us as foreigners.* And what is a Frenchman? *A foreigner.* What is a Frenchman who comes to Switzerland? *He's a foreigner, but a little bit Swiss too.* Why? *Because he's come to Switzerland.* What is a Frenchman who stays in France? *A Frenchman and a foreigner.* And if I asked a little French boy the same question, what would he tell me? *That he's French.* He'd tell me that he's a foreigner as well? *No, he's French.*

It is interesting to compare these reactions with our observations on children at the same stage II, recorded in sections I and II. It will be recalled that in their judgments on their homeland and other countries, these children reflected an attitude that might be described as bipolar, if not equivocal: there is a certain degree of logical activity, testifying to progress beyond the egocentricity of the first stage towards "decentration" and integration; but there is also a certain lack of independence, reflected in an acceptance of family opinions, thus transforming the initial egocentricity into sociocentricity, as opposed to "decentration". Here we come across the same bipolarity, but in terms of reciprocity—the new attitude to which we should no doubt look for an explanation of the above reactions. On the one hand, the child has progressed sufficiently far beyond his immediate standpoint not to claim that a Swiss living in another country can never be a foreigner, etc.; this is certainly a development towards reciprocity. But this reciprocity may be said always to stop midway, since there nevertheless remains an undercurrent of

sociocentricity tantamount to the assertion that a Swiss (or Genevese, etc.) is not exactly comparable with other people. It is surely the precarious nature of this incipient faculty for integration that accounts for this type of inconsistency.

However, at stage III, the problem appears to be entirely mastered:

*Murielle F.* 10;6. Do you know what a foreigner is? *It's someone in a country other than his own.* Could you become a foreigner? *Not for the Swiss, but I could for others if I don't stay in my country.*

*Robert N.* 11;0. You know what a foreigner is? *Yes, they're all the people who are not from the same country as ourselves.* And could you become a foreigner? *Yes, for all the other people who are not Swiss, as I was born in a different country from them, so I'd be a foreigner.*

*Marion B.* 12;4. What is your nationality? *I'm Swiss.* What is a Swiss person living in Switzerland? *Swiss.* Is he a foreigner? *No, not for the Swiss.* What is he if he goes to France? *He's still Swiss, but he'd become a foreigner for the French.* And what is a Frenchman in France? *French.* And what is he if he comes to Switzerland? *He's French, but for us he's a foreigner.*

*Pierre J.* 12;6. What nationality are you? *I'm Swiss.* What nationality is a Swiss living in Switzerland? *He's Swiss.* Is he a foreigner? *No, or perhaps he's a foreigner for foreigners.* What do you mean? *For the French and Germans, for instance, the Swiss are foreigners.* Quite right. Now if a Swiss person went to France, what would he be? *For the French he's a foreigner, but for us he isn't, he's still Swiss.* What is a Frenchman living in France? *He's French and not a foreigner for the French, but for us he's a foreigner.*

Thus, as regards the formation of logical concepts and relationships no further obstacle to reciprocity is discernible at this level. Is the same true from the affective standpoint?

### *Affective Motivation*

Although there appears to be no direct relationship between the question which country children would choose were they to lose their nationality, and whether they themselves are always foreigners to other people because others are foreigners for them, we found a striking concurrence between the corresponding reactions at the three stages considered.

At stage I, not only does the child choose his own country, but he also imagines that a national of another country would likewise choose Switzerland, as though no one could fail to recognize this objective pre-eminence. Here are a few sample remarks made towards the end of stage I (before then, the question is meaningless, as the children are at first quite unaware of their own nationality):

*Christian K.* 6;5. If you were born without belonging to any country, which would you choose? *I'd like to become Swiss.* (The child is Swiss.) Why? *Because. . . .* Say you could choose between France and Switzerland, would you choose Switzerland? *Yes.* Why? *Because the French are nasty. The Swiss are nicer.* Why? *Because the Swiss didn't go to war.*

If I asked a little French boy the same question as I asked you just now and said to him: now look, imagine you were born without any nationality and that now you can choose what you like, what do you think this child would choose? *He'd want to be Swiss. Why? Because he just would.* And if I were to ask him who is nicer, the Swiss or the French, or whether they're both as good as each other, what would he say? *He would say that the Swiss are nicer than the French. Why would he? Because . . . they know the Swiss are nicer.*

*Charles K. 6;11.* If you were born without any nationality and you were allowed to choose what nationality you liked, which would you choose? *I'd become Swiss. Why? Because there's more to eat.* Do you think the French are nicer or not so nice or just the same as the Swiss? *The Swiss are nicer. Why? I don't know.* If I were to say to a little German boy, for instance, "Now imagine you were born without any nationality and you could choose what nationality you like", what do you think he would choose? *He'd say that he'd like to be Swiss. Why? Because we're better off in Switzerland.* And if I asked him who was nicer? *He'd say the Swiss are. Why? Because they didn't go to war.*

*Brian S. 6;2 (English).* If you were born without any nationality and you could now choose whichever you liked, what country would you choose? *English, because I know lots of them.* Do you think the English are nicer, not so nice, or just the same as the Swiss? *The English are nicer. Why? The Swiss are always quarrelling.* If a Swiss child were given a free choice of nationality, what do you think he would choose? *He'd choose English. Why? Because I was born there.* He couldn't choose any other country? *Yes, France perhaps. Why France? It's a lovely country. I've been there on holidays at the seaside.* And who do the Swiss think are nicer, the Swiss or the English? *The English. Why? Because. . . Why? Because they just are.*

It is surprising to find that, as soon as the question is understood, children at this stage voice nationalist feelings that were apparently absent in the children at stage I, described in section I. But apart from the fact that, towards the end of stage I, children begin to be influenced by remarks they pick up (as they will be to an increasing extent during stage II), a factor associated with the actual interrogation should be borne in mind: the first question asked refers to the nationality of the child questioned, and thus has the force of a deliberate suggestion, whereas in section I, his attention was not drawn to this point at the outset.

During stage II, reciprocity appears as a "symmetrical" choice attributed by the child to others of different nationality:

*Marina T. 7;9 (Italian).* If you were born without any nationality and you were now given a free choice, what nationality would you choose? *Italian. Why? Because it's my country. I like it better than Argentina where my father works, because Argentina isn't my country.* Are Italians just the same, or more, or less intelligent than the Argentinians? What do you think? *The Italians are more intelligent. Why? I can see the people I live with, they're Italians.* If I were to give a child from Argentina a free choice of nationality, what do you think he would choose? *He'd want to stay an Argentinian. Why? Because that's his country.* And if I were to ask him

who is more intelligent, the Argentinians or the Italians, what do you think he would answer? *He'd say the Argentinians. Why? Because there wasn't any war. Good. Now who was really right in the choice he made and what he said, the Argentinian child, you or both? I was right. Why? Because I chose Italy.*

*Jeannot P. 8;0 (St. Gall) (Bright child). If you had no nationality and you were given a free choice of nationality, what would you choose? I'd choose to be St. Gallois. Why? I don't know. Who is nicer, an Italian or a St. Gallois, or are they just the same? What do you think? The St. Gallois are nicer. Why? Because I know. And who is more intelligent? The St. Gallois are more intelligent. Why? Because my Daddy is a St. Gallois. If I were to give an Italian a free choice of nationality, what do you think he would choose? Italy. Why? Because I know a boy at school who is an Italian, and he wants to stay Italian. And if I were to ask this boy who is nicer, a St. Gallois or an Italian, what would he say? I don't know what he thinks, but perhaps he would say Italian. Why? I don't know. And if I were to ask him who is more intelligent? He'd say Italian. Why? Because he has a Daddy too. Now what do you really think? Who was right, you or the Italian? You haven't answered the same thing, now who do you think gave the best answer? I did. Why? Because the St. Gallois are more intelligent.*

*Maurice D. 8;3 (Swiss). If you didn't have any nationality and you were given a free choice of nationality, which would you choose? Swiss nationality. Why? Because I was born in Switzerland. Now look, do you think the French and the Swiss are equally nice, or the one nicer or less nice than the other? The Swiss are nicer. Why? The French are always nasty. Who is more intelligent, the Swiss or the French, or do you think they're just the same? The Swiss are more intelligent. Why? Because they learn French quickly. If I asked a French boy to choose any nationality he liked, what country do you think he'd choose? He'd choose France. Why? Because he is in France. And what would he say about who's the nicer? Would he think the Swiss and the French equally nice or one better than the other? He'd say the French are nicer. Why? Because he was born in France. And who would he think more intelligent? The French. Why? He'd say that the French want to learn quicker than the Swiss. Now you and the French boy don't really give the same answer. Who do you think answered best? I did. Why? Because Switzerland is always better.*

We see that while the child is induced to choose his own country (as at stage I) he is then easily made to place himself in the position of children from other countries. We thus have a relative parallelism with our observations concerning the intellectual "structuration" typical of stage II. But—and this further strengthens the parallel—at the end of the conversation, we only have to add "but who is really right?" to break down this incipient reciprocity and to bring the child questioned round to an attitude resembling that adopted during stage I. Lastly, at stage III, children show a genuine understanding of the "reciprocity" of points of view, and some resistance to the final suggestion.

*Arlette R. 12;6 (Swiss). If you had no nationality and you were given a free choice of whatever nationality you liked, which would you choose?*

*Swiss nationality. Why? Because I was born in Switzerland and this is my home. Right. Who do you think is nicer, the French or the Swiss, or do you think they are just the same? Oh, on the whole, they're much the same. There are some very nice Swiss and some very nice French people, that doesn't depend on the country. Who is more intelligent, a Swiss or a French person? All people have their good points. The Swiss don't sing too badly and the French have some great composers. If I were to give a Frenchman a free choice of nationality, what do you think he would choose? French. Why? Because he was born in France and that's his country. And who would seem nicer to a French girl, a French or a Swiss boy? I don't know, perhaps the French for her but you can't be sure. Which of you would be right? You can't tell. Everyone is right in his own eyes. All people have their opinions.*

*Janine C. 13;4. Choice of nationality. I'd choose to be Swiss. Why? Because it's my country and I love it. Who do you think are nicer, the Swiss or the French? They're just the same as each other. It doesn't depend on the country, but on the people. And who are more intelligent, the Swiss or the French? That's the same thing too. France is bigger, so there are more people to think, but we have our scholars and professors in Switzerland too. What would a French person choose? He would choose France. Why? It's his country and he loves it. Whom do you think he would find more intelligent, the Swiss or the French? That's difficult to tell. Perhaps he would say they're just the same or he might say the French are, because there are more people in France to think. Now who do you really think is right and has given the best reply? You can't say, as that depends on everyone's mentality, but there are all types of people, intelligent and stupid, good and bad.*

We see how, despite the inevitable superficiality of the questions to which we were forced to confine ourselves, the broad outline of this development may be clearly traced. We may thus draw two main conclusions. One is that the child's discovery of his homeland and understanding of other countries is a process of transition from egocentricity to reciprocity. The other is that this gradual development is liable to constant setbacks, usually through the re-emergence of egocentricity on a broader or sociocentric plane, at each new stage in this development, or as each new conflict arises. Accordingly, the main problem is not to determine what must or must not be inculcated in the child; it is to discover how to develop that reciprocity in thought and action which is vital to the attainment of impartiality and affective understanding.